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Abstract 
We study jointly the health perception of the elderly and the care giving decision of their 
adult children. Social interactions play a crucial role: elder parents' health perception 
depends on relations with household members. On the other hand adult children make their 
care giving decisions strategically, meaning that each of them considers his siblings' 
decision. We find empirical evidence which support this claim using the 2004 wave of the 
SHARE survey. We estimate social interaction effects by means of methods taken from the 
spatial econometric literature. Health perception relation with care giving depends on the 
determinants of adult children's decision to care: Parents' health may be modelled as a 
common good for parents and children; the latter's decision may be driven by bequest 
motives or by pure altruism and/or cultural values. We test implications of the model 
thanks to the unique features of the SHARE dataset: it is trans--national, allowing to control 
for cultural and institutional differences, it contains information on health status of over-50 
Europeans and details on their social and intergenerational relations. 
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1 Introdution
Aging is one of the main onerns in most European Countries. While this
proess is the result of sienti development and improved eonomi living
onditions, it rises several poliy issues. First of all, pension systems are
under revision in many ountries, in order to be sustainable in soieties with
a shrinking labor fore ompared to an expanding number of retired people.
Health are, and in partiular long term are systems must adapt to this
hanging soiety as well. This is the fous of our paper: we are interested in
the relation between formal and informal are, and in the strategi behav-
ior of aregivers and arereeivers. This is a relevant topi from a poliy
perspetive: institutions an hange the ost and availability of formal are.
Nevertheless the overall impat of dierent settings depend on the relation
between formal and informal are provision. As an example: reduing the
ost for formal are may redue or inrease the supply of informal one, de-
pending on whether those servies are substitutes or omplements. Further,
aring is a timeonsuming ativity whih is not neessarily ompatible with
a full time oupation, thus time devoted to informal are and labor fore
partiipation are negatively related. we will formalize all these relations in
a gametheoreti setting. In a nutshell: the amount of are provided by non
oresiding siblings an be thought of as the equilibrium output between
the supply and the demand for informal are in the `family market'. This
is not new in the literature, and suh an output has been obtained from
a bargaining proess (Pezzin and Steinberg Shone (1999)). We will follow
an alternative approah based on a nonooperative game among altruisti
players. Our aim is to study both sides of the market, devoting a partiular
attention to interations among family members. Care supply has already
been studied as an endogenous hoie on the labor deisions of siblings,
in partiular to explain gender dierenes in labor market partiipation and
wages (Ettner (1995), Ettner (1996), Wolf and Soldo (1994), Crespo (2007)).
Usually the fous is not on are giving hoies, whih at most are onsidered
as endogenous fators in the labor market deision. In the present paper we
turn our attention to the are giving hoie itself, ontrolling for endogenous
labor supply. Suh an approah allows us to onentrate on the strategi in-
teration among siblings: the hoie to alloate hours to parent's are depend
ruially on the same hoie done by brothers and sisters.
Demand for health are depends on the health status of the elders. A
strutural model of the demand side is beyond the sope of the paper. Health
status an be thought as the output of an aumulation proess (Grossman
(1972)). In suh a setting, demand for informal are as well as for publily
provided health are servies an be though of as an input in the health
apital prodution funtion. Anyway, we are fousing on people older than
50: at that age, the aumulation proess an be onsidered as nished:
even if healthy behavior, suh as not smoking or a proper diet still improve
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objetive health, important inputs in the health aumulation funtion as
inome, eduation, living arrangement depend on hoies that an safely be
assumed to be predetermined. Our fous then turns to a subjetive measure
of health, whih is self reported pereived health.
Measuring pereived health is not the same as measuring objetive health
(see Jurges (2005) for a detailed disussion on health measures in SHARE).
The selfpereption of health status entails objetive health onditions, but
also individual preferene or general attitude, soial and family network de-
terminants and ultural dierenes (Reher (1998); Silverstein and Bengtson
(1997), Collins (2004)). Then, we laim that self reported health is a measure
of wellbeing, not only a measure of physial health orreted by individual
and soiologial ountry dierenes. This is oherent with the World Health
Organization
1
denition of health:
[. . . ] a state of omplete physial, mental and soial wellbeing
and not merely the absene of disease or inrmity
The paper is strutured as follows: the next setion outlines the eonomi
model; the third one desribes the SHARE dataset. Next we move to the
eonometri speiation and estimation proedure. Fifth setion reports
and omments on the results, onlusions are drawn in the last setion.
2 The Eonomi model
We model the aring deision as a oneshot non ooperative game among
parents, P1, P2, and their hildren, S1, S2, . . . , Sn. Children hoose how muh
time to spend aring for their parents, I1, . . . , In and how muh to spend in
leisure, L1, . . . , LS . Parents an hoose how muh of their inome to buy
formal are hours, F , but they an also transfer (or ommit to transfer inthe
future) an amount of money to their hildren as a bequest, B. Further
on, they an hoose how to split suh a bequest amongst their hildren: β
stands for the sharing rule applied by parents. Following Sloan et al. (1997),
we hose not to model aring deisions as a ooperative game sine in suh
a model players should fae an innite number of periods. We think this
assumption is unrealisti: parent's death is an event that an't be negleted
in aring hoies.
Children's help is provided to parents' households, thus as a starting
point we assume there is a single parent. We will disuss in the following
setion what deision rules among parents are onsistent with our model
and the relevane of the single parent assumption. Children are all equal
and have the same strategies, thus we an assume without loss of generality
there are just two of them. Again, we will disuss at lenght impliations of
this simplifying assumption.
1
Constitution of the World Health Organization, Geneva 1946
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Parent and sons are altruisti: hildren are worried about their parents'
health, while P utility depend on hildren's utility derived from onsumption.
Formally, P, S1, S2 fae the following maximization problems:
P 's problem:
maxF,B,β
{
UQ(Q) + U I(I1) + V
C(C1) + U
I(I2) + V
C(C2)
}
s.t.
Q = F + I1 + I2
pFF +B ≤ Y P
(1)
Where pF is the market prie for formal are, Ci is ith son's onsumption
and Y P is inome. We model the deision proess as a oneshot game, thus
there are no savings and urrent and permanent inome oinide. Parent's
utility funtion is assumed to depend only on are and not on other goods'
onsumption. This is equivalent to assume separability of are from all other
available goods in P 's utility.
Si problem: max
Ii,Li
{
UQ(Q) + V C(Ci)
}
s.t.
Q = F + Ii + I−i
Y i +Bi(β) = Ci
Y i = ω(T − Li − Ii)
Li + Ii ≤ T
Li ≥ 0
Ii ≥ 0
(2)
ω is market wage and T is total available time. Suh a model is similar to
Bernheim et al. (1985) (assuming additively separable utility funtions) and
to Sloan et al. (1997) (assuming no inome sharing and no ooperation within
the family), but it onsiders as endogenous the labor fore partiipation dei-
sion. The total amount of are, Q, is a publi good (partly) produed within
the family. Child i's utility is onave, rst inreasing and then dereasing
in Ii. U
P
has the same shape, but it depends also on the additional terms
U I(Ii): these term allows us to formalize the idea that P attahes a higher
a value to informal are per se, while Si is indierent on the type of are
his parent reeives as long as the amount Q is provided. Formally, these
assumptions an be expressed in terms of utility's rst derivatives:
∂UQ
∂Q
> 0;
∂U I
∂I
> 0;
∂V C
∂C
> 0
the shape of US and UP together with positiveness of rst derivatives
implies that
argmaxIi
UP > argmaxIiU
S
(3)
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US depends on F only through the publi good UQ. Then,
∂US
∂F
=
∂US
∂UQ
·
∂UQ
∂Q
·
∂Q
∂F
=
∂UQ
∂Q
> 0
Whih implies that S utility funtion is always inreasing in parent's
hoie variable F : if P do not ommit to transfer any bequest B, hildren
atually hoose IS independently of their parent's hoie of F . Thus without
bequest ith hild's maximization problem an be rewritten as
Si problem: max
Ii,Li,Ci
{
UQ(Q) + V C(Ci)
}
s.t.
Q = F + Ii + I−i
Ci = Y
i = ω(T − Li − Ii)
Li + Ii ≤ T
Li ≥ 0
Ii ≥ 0
(4)
Absene of a bequest implies that P do not partiipate to the game
between hildren: parent's hoie of F an only inrease hildren utilities,
thus S1 and S2 deide regardless of P 's provision of formal are. In this
setting hild i utility is always positively aeted by I−i: i's sibling informal
are augment the publi good enjoyed by i at no prie. Thus hild i either
does not reat to a positive I−i, or his supply of informal are is rowded
out, sine I−i substitutes Ii and i an realloate part of his resoures to
onsumption. Thus eah hild take parent and siblings deisions as given
and maximize
max
Ii,Li
{
UQ(F¯ + Ii + I¯−i) + V
C(ω(T − Li)− ωIi)
}
s.t.
Li + Ii ≤ T
Li ≥ 0
Ii ≥ 0
(5)
Nonnegativity onstraints are imposed sine orner solutions are not
ruled out, i.e. i an hoose to work all his available time or to spend it all
providing are. The KuhnTuker onditions are
−ω
∂V C
∂C
− λ1 + λ2 = 0 (6)
−ω
∂V C
∂C
+
∂UQ
∂Q
− λ1 + λ3 = 0 (7)
λ1(T − Li − Ii) = 0 (8)
λ2Li = 0 (9)
λ3Ii = 0 (10)
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Together with
λ1 ≥ 0; λ2 ≥ 0; λ3 ≥ 0
The KuhnTuker multipliers λ1, λ2 and λ3 an be interpreted respe-
tively as the opportunity osts of working, leisure and informal are. Solving
the maximization problem we get the optimal alloation of time by eah
son: i alloates always all his time in the ativity haraterized by the lower
opportunity ost. Further more, any optimal alloation involving informal
are (i.e., if Ii > 0) does not involve leisure, sine its opportunity ost is
ertainly higher than the informal are's one: Ii and Li have the same ost
in terms of forgone wages (i.e. they enter in the same way in V C), but Ii
has also a utility inreasing eet sine it inreases UQ, the altruisti part
of US . Then regardless of λ1, λ2 < λ3 and therefore we obtain an internal
solution only if working and providing are have the same opportunity ost,
i.e. if lambda1 = λ2.
As we already stated P do not enter the game sine he an't inuene
I's hoies with F , thus P 's maximization is:
max
F
{
UQ(F + I¯i + I¯−i) + U
I(I¯i) + U
I(I¯−i) + V
C(C¯i) + V
C(C¯−i)
}
s.t. pFF ≤ Y P
(11)
Sine UQ is always inreasing in F , the optimal hoie for P is to alloate
all his resoures to F : F¯ = Y P/pF .
Those alloations are Pareto eient, i.e. neither the sons nor the parent
an modify their hoie in suh a way that either P , S1 or S2 are better
o without reduing someone else's utility. Nevertheless sine P prefers
informal to formal are whatever is the hoie of I by his sons, UP as a
funtion of Ii, I−i is never maximized. This result motivates the introdution
of strategi bequest as in Bernheim et al. (1985): P an `substitute' formal
are with informal one ommitting to transfer a bequest to his sons. The
new maximization problems are:
max
F,B,β
{
UQ(F + I¯i + I¯−i) + U
I(I¯i) + U
I(I¯−i) + V
C(C¯i) + V
C(C¯−i)
}
s.t. pFF +Bi(β) +B−i(β) ≤ Y
P
(12)
Bi depends on β: the parents hooses how muh to transfer to his sons,
but also how to split it between them.
6
Si problem: max
Ii,Li
{
UQ(Q) + V C(Ci)
}
s.t.
Q = F¯ + Ii + I¯−i
Y i + B¯i(β¯) = Ci
Y i = ω(T − Li − Ii)
Li + Ii ≤ T
Li ≥ 0
Ii ≥ 0
(13)
The eet of the transfer Bi on i's deision depend ruially on the shar-
ing rule adopted by P . If Bi > 0, but the sharing rule is suh that Bi does
not depend on −i's hoie (i.e. on are provided by siblings, I−i), the be-
quest does not alter the eet of siblings' hoies about are provision on
i's hoie. Then in this ase the only eet of the bequest Bi > 0 is that it
relaxes i's budget onstraint, but it does not hange the KuhnTuker on-
ditions and the relative pries of working, leisure and informal are: if the
opportunity ost of Iiwas higher then the one of working, bequest annot
indue the hildren to provide informal are. Nevertheless, if in equilibrium
without bequest I¯i > 0, P an obtain extra are and therefore inrease his
utility transferring B to his hild. The starting point is that I¯i > 0 implies
that either the opportunity ost of providing are is lower or it is equal to
the one of working. In the rst ase, P substitutes formal with informal
are: he will buy F ∗ = (F¯ − δ) and indue i to alloate I∗i = I¯i + δ, where
δ = B/pF . The new alloation does not alter i's utility: UQ is unhanged
sine Q is the same; V C(Ci) is unhanged as well sine the ost of the extra
IC is balaned by Bi. Parent's utility U
P
inreases sine ∀I ∂U I/∂I > 0.
Vie versa, if shadow pries are equal and therefore we start from an in-
ternal solution (0 < I¯i < T ), the U
P
growth due to a higher level of Ii
and/or Ci does not neessarily ompensate the parent's utility loss due to
the inome redution −Bi. This is due to the fat that sine players hoose
simultaneously P is not able to indue i to use Bi to maximize P 's utility: i
will use the extra inome to augment his onsumption if his marginal utility
∂V C/∂Ci > ∂U
Q/∂Ii, vie versa he will inrease the informal are provi-
sion. In other words, the hildren will provide an extra amount of I only
if the altruisti motivation will prevail. Then we make the same assumption
Bernheim et al. (1985) did: Parent selets the transfer subsequent to the
hild's hoie of Ii. Sine the transfer we are talking about is a bequest, this
seems reasonable: the model involves just one period, results do not hange
with expeted intervivos transfers
2
. Thus, given the timing of the deision
and the fat that opportunity osts of working and providing are are the
2
On the empirial part we will onsider both expeted bequest and past inter vivos
transfers, but the latter are not inluded amongst the Parent's hoie variables
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same, i antiipates P 's transfer and alloate Bi to extra are as in the orner
solution's ase.
This result does not neessarily lead to a global maximum for P : if his
budget onstraint is binding, he ould be unable to provide Bi up to the point
that maximizes UP (I). Results hanges if P splits the overall bequest among
his hildren proportionally to the are provided by eah of them: P an set
β in suh a way he extrats an additional amount of informal are from eah
son at the same prie as before. In the previous paragraphs the hild had
a `monopoly' over Bi: i sets the prie for the extra are at the level that
maximizes his utility (i.e. the transfer Bi that leaves his utility unaltered
ompared to the nonbequest ase). The presene of siblings an redue i's
market power over the bequest. In order to larify this point, remeber we are
assuming (without loss of generality) that there are two hildren. Bernheim
et al. (1985) shows that if β assigns shares Bi proportional to Ii/I1+I2, then
in equilibrium both I1 and I2 are greater or equal than without bequest. We
now want to extend this result onsidering Li as endogenous. Let's all I
∗
i
the informal are supplied by i at equilibrium without bequest. The sharing
rule is the following: if both S1 and S2 provide a level of are whih is higher
or equal than I∗i , eah one will reeive a bequest proportional to the relative
amount of are provided:
Bi =
Ii
I1 + I2
On the other hand, if one or both of them will provide an amount Ii < I
∗
i ,
the whole amount B will be given to the `most generous hild':
∃i : Ii < I
∗
i ⇒ Bi =


B if Ii > I−i
0 if Ii < I−i
0 if Ii = I−i < mini I
∗
i
This is an appliation of the Rotten Kid theorem whih Bernheim et al.
(1985) prove to hold with exogenous labor supply deision. In order to
show that the result holds also in our model, we rewrite the KuhnTuker
onditions:
−ω
∂V C
∂C
− λ1 + λ2 = 0 (14)(
∂B
∂Ii
− ω
)
∂V C
∂C
+
∂UQ
∂Q
− λ1 + λ3 = 0 (15)
λ1(T − Li − Ii) = 0 (16)
λ2Li = 0 (17)
λ3Ii = 0 (18)
Then, sine ∂B/∂Ii > 0, from the rst two onditions it's easy to see that
the opportunity ost of informal are λ3 is still larger than the opportunity
8
ost of leisure λ2 and the dierene (λ3 − λ2) inreases with respet to the
ase of no bequest. Then λ's ordering is unhanged, whih means that the
bequest sharing rule does not alter the eet of the labor partiipation hoie
on the informal are one and Bernheim et al. (1985) still holds. What does
hange is the role of I−i on Si hoie: while without suh a sharing rule hild
i utility is always positively aeted by I−i, now it has also a negative eet,
sine Bi is dereasing in I−i. Then if the strategi bequest motive is valid
(and only in this ase), an inrease in I−i ould have a positive marginal
eet on i's supply of informal are.
2.1 Relaxing the assumptions: one hild, two parents
We assumed at the beginning of this setion that there are at least two
hildren. With a single hild and no bequest, the altruisti feature of hild's
utility ntion (an) lead to a positive provision of informal are, regardless
of parent's hoie of F . While it's meaningless speaking about sharing rules
in this ase, still P an indue an higher provision of I with respet to the
`altruisti' level ommitting to transfer a positive B to his hild. From a
welfare perspetive, the presene of more than one hild has the same eet
as moving from a monopoly to an oligopoly: hildren - given the bequest
amount and the sharing rule - ompete á la Cournot on quantities of informal
are to be sold to the unique lient, the parent. Equilibrium harateristis
are the usual one of CournotNash outomes, in partiular the total amount
I1 + I2 supplied is larger than in monopoly.
In other words the amount of informal are provided by eah hild de-
pends ruially on the bargaining power of the parent. If there is only one
hild, P an inrease the level of informal are only transferring part of his
disposable inome to his hild. If there are two (or more) hildren he an
make them ompete for the bequest obtaining an extra amount of are from
them. Nevertheless, if there is no bequest, there are no gains moving from
one to a higher number of hildren. From the son's point of view what mat-
ters is the sharing rule: without bequest or if the bequest share is xed,
there is basially no interation among hildren: eah one an maximize his
own utility on his own time alloation and their hoies are not altered by
the presene of siblings. This is not true if the bequest amount depends on
the relative supply of informal are. In this ase an inrease in I−i inreases
UQ but redues Bi: i must take it into aount one he maximizes U
S
i .
The eet of the presene of a spouse depends on how parent's household
deision proess is modelled. A rst hoie (the soalled `unitarian' model)
is to assume that individuals have the same preferenes and therefore the
household as a whole an be onsidered the elementary deision unit with
its own unique utility funtion. This approah is not fully satisfatory. An
appealing alternative are models of `olletive' utility: they are haraterized
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by two dierent utility funtions and some deision rule to split resoures.
Chiappori (1992) provides a ommon framework for those models. In par-
tiular, oherently with the previous setions, we assume individuals to be
altruisti: the father's utility depends on his own are onsumption and on
his partner's utility. The deision rule an be thought of as a twostage pro-
edure: rst, parents share their inome and informal are provided by the
hildren, then eah of them optimally hooses his or her own onsumption.
Chiappori (1992) result is that with olletive utility funtions any alloation
that respet this proess is Pareto eient. Whih partiular alloation is
reahed depends on the shape of eah parent's utility. Within this frame-
work a very simple utility speiation is onsistent with saving hoies (see
Browning (2000) for details on the model and Alessie et al. (2006) for an
appliation). As long as hildren are altruisti toward parents' household
as a whole, any olletive utility is onsistent with the model developed in
the previous setions. We just need to assume that informal are is supplied
to the parent's household and not to eah member separately; bequest to
hildren is a dierent good from bequest to the surviving spouse and parents
have a ommon budget onstraint to abide by.
2.2 Empirial impliations
The eonomi model gives us a number of empirial impliations. In parti-
ular, we have three features to test on hildren hoies: rst, endogeneity of
labor supply deision in informal are; seond, the interations among hil-
dren when hoosing how muh time to devote to aring; third, the relevane
of the strategi bequest motive in hildren's hoies.
While the rst point is lear, some words should be spent on the follow-
ing two points, whih are related. If the bequest motive is purely altruisti,
or in general if expeted bequest do not depend on hildren's behavior, par-
ent's expeted bequest or potential future transfers should have no role on
hildren deision. Further, eah hild i enjoys the publi good made up of
formal are and informal are provided by eah of his siblings. Therefore i's
help either is not aet by his siblings' help, or it is rowded out by them.
A omplementary relationship is not onsistent with suh an explanation.
Vie versa if the bequest motive is strategi, the marginal eet of parent's
expeted bequest on informal are hoie should be positive and informal
are of eah hild an be in a omplementarity relation, but there annot be
rowding out. Thus we an disriminate among bequest motives estimating
the marginal eet on i's informal are supply of other sibling's help.
On the parent's side, the main hypothesis is that informal are inreases
utility derived from are. We an go further: the whole model holds also
if parent's utility depends only on total informal are (i.e. U I(I1) + · · · +
U I(In) an be replaed by U
I(I1 + · · · + In)). Thus, we an test whether
parents attah a dierent value to eah hild or if they value informal are
10
independently on the giver.
3 The SHARE dataset
We use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Eu-
rope (SHARE
3
). It ollets ross-national interdisiplinary data on soio
eonomi harateristis, health status, family and soial networks of persons
aged 50 and over. SHARE provides details about respondent's health and
about the provision of formal and informal are to the elderly people. More-
over the survey ontains spei information about individual and household
inome and about real and nanial assets. SHARE dataset has a number
of harateristis that ts our problem very well. First of all, the survey ol-
lets two dierent types of health status measures: self-reported pereived
health and objetive measures of health. In the physial health module in-
dividuals are asked to self report their urrent health status. Two sales are
allowed: the European and the Amerian version of the soalled `pereived
health
4
'. On the other hand, there are many variables that give us an ob-
jetive measure of health: we onsider two generated variables. The rst
desribes the number of limitations with ativities of daily living (ADL
5
).
The seond desribes the number of hroni diseases reported by eah in-
dividual
6
. We use both the subjetive and the objetive measures in our
analysis: we laim that `pereived health' is a measure of wellbeing that
depends not only on the objetive health status, but also on soial supports
and interations between parents and hildren. In other words, we use per-
eived health as a measure of utility derived from aring, while ontrolling
3
This paper uses data from early release 1 of SHARE 2004. This release is prelimi-
nary and may ontain errors that will be orreted in later releases. The SHARE data
olletion has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5
th
frame-
work programme (projet QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the themati programme Quality of
Life). Additional funding ame from the US National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-
13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-064).
Data olletion in Austria (through the Austrian Siene Fund, FWF), Belgium (through
the Belgian Siene Poliy Oe) and Switzerland (through BBW/OFES/UFES) was
nationally funded. The SHARE data set is introdued in Börsh-Supan et al. (2005);
methodologial details are ontained in Börsh-Supan and Jürgens (2005).
4
Respondent is initially randomised to answer to the European or to the Amerian
sale of the self-pereived health. At the end of the health module the respondent answers
to the same question, but on the other sale so that we ollet both measures for eah
respondent . The European sale is: 1 Very good, 2 Good, 3 Fair, 4 Bad and 5 Very bad.
Amerian sale is: 1 Exellent, 2 Very good, 3 Good, 4 Fair and 5 Poor
5
Six ativities are inluded: dressing, walking, bathing or showering, eating, getting in
and out of bed and using the toilet
6
The variable orresponds to the followings diseases: hearth attak, high blood pres-
sure or hypertension, high blood holesterol, a stroke or erebral vasular disease, diabetes,
hroni bronhitis or emphysema, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, aner or malignant tu-
mour, stomah or duodenal uler, Parkinson disease, atarats and hip frature or femoral
frature
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for objetive health. This is not the only advantage of using SHARE: the
dataset provides information on all our hoie variables, hours of informal
are, hours of payed job, formal are and expeted bequest. Informal are is
measured in hours of are reeived from every hildren of the respondent per
week. SHARE reports three types of help: personal are, help in housekeep-
ing and paperwork. Most of the hours of help provided falls in the seond
ategory. There is a wide heterogeneity aross dierent Countries (see table
1): while Central and Northern Countries are those with the higher level
of are, Southern ones are those were among those who provide are there
is the higher share devoted to personal are. This seond feature is in line
with dierent institutional arrangements: Northern Countries, whih have
the most generous elders' support system, are those where hildren devote
less time to personal are. Unfortunately the sample size do not allow us to
exploit the dierenes among those three types of help: we are going to use
the aggregate number of help hours aross the three types of help. Thus,
rossountry omparison, whih is one of the main potentials of SHARE,
will mix up institutional settings with ultural dierenes (see Reher (1998)
for a disussion on NorthSouth dierenes in family ties).
The seond hoie variable we need is hours of payed job, whih are not
diretly surveyed in SHARE. Nevertheless this does not mean we do not
have any information: we know whether eah hild does work or not, and if
he/she works full time or part time. We used CESIFO tables on the average
olletively agreed normal annual working time by Country (EIRO data) and
on the parttime average hours of work as a perentage of fulltime hours
(OECD data) to build the working hours variable we need. Parent's rst
hoie variable is formal are. Again, we have three measures of it: hours
per week of professional nursing are, hours reeived of paid domesti help
and number of weeks in whih the respondent reeived meals on wheels.
Even if we faed the same problem as with informal are data (i.e. too few
observations to evaluate eah type of help separately), we were not able to
aggregate them due to the dierent units of measure. Thus we inluded the
three variables separately despite the low number of observations.
Last but not least SHARE allows us to build a proper measure of expeted
wealth: individuals are asked whether they expet to leave more than 50.000
euros as a bequest. Conditional on this rst question, they are asked whether
they expet to leave any bequest, or if they expet to leave more than 150.000
euros. Using these answers we built an expeted bequest measure. Thus, we
have the `perfet' measure: we do not have to rely on urrent wealth to infer
expeted bequest, thus the variable we use is exogenous by onstrution.
The last harateristi of SHARE we have to onsider is that the data
potentially provides information on three generations: respondents, their
hildren and their parents. We fous on respondents and their hildren sine
health measures are available only for respondents. This hoie may indue
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Table 1: Types of Informal and Formal Care
SE DK NL DE BE FR AT CH IT ES GR Obs
Informal are
personal are 13 11 6 20 19 14 22 1 19 31 23 179
% 4.89 5.58 5.00 6.87 9.36 11.76 11.06 1.82 19.19 41.33 11.27 9.97
housekeeping 235 179 83 266 186 90 172 41 67 58 136 1513
% 88.35 90.86 69.17 91.41 91.63 75.63 86.43 74.55 67.68 77.33 66.67 82.77
paperwork 54 27 47 96 53 63 59 24 52 41 133 649
% 20.30 13.71 39.17 32.99 26.11 52.64 29.65 43.64 52.53 54.67 65.20 35.50
hours of help 1.93 2.74 2.12 4.80 5.73 10.82 5.73 3.86 17.65 14.62 7.21
per week (hours>0)
Formal are
nursing are 41 87 85 45 411 559 60 3 46 110 2 1449
% 1.35 5.10 2.86 1.53 10.84 17.72 3.23 0.30 1.82 4.79 0.07 5.14
hours per week 8.34 9.31 7.88 14.11 4.25 3.50 28.65 1.00 4.52 2.66 30.50
paid domesti help 131 166 262 46 375 219 59 10 68 94 3 1433
% 4.30 9.72 8.80 1.56 9.89 6.94 3.17 1.00 2.70 4.09 0.10 5.09
hours per week 6.27 2.35 4.44 14.54 5.35 9.86 11.85 8.50 15.65 12.60 22.33
meals on wheels 39 46 33 42 61 34 38 0 0 4 0 297
% 1.28 2.69 1.11 1.43 1.61 1.08 2.04 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.05
# of weeks 16.73 27.31 19.53 20.47 19.38 21.67 29.39 0.00 0.00 3.75 0.00
Informal Care givers % refers to hildren who give help. Formal Care givers % to all sample
1
3
a bias: the sampling sheme is based on the respondents, thus results on
respondent's hildren deision may not be representative for the whole hil-
dren population. As far as we know the only author that takled this issue
in SHARE is Crespo (2007), who uses SHARE to analyse the role of infor-
mal are ativity on female labor supply. She exploits information on both
samples, nding qualitatively similar results.
4 The Eonometri speiation
Before going to the speiation of the eonometri model we set up to test
the empirial impliations, some words must be spent on a hidden assump-
tion of the model: throughout the previous setions we didn't disuss the
living arrangement hoie of the hildren. Whether the hild oresides with
his parents or not does hange his aring hoies. Living arrangements of
the elderly has been previously studied by Börsh-Supan et al. (1988); Börsh-
Supan et al. (1993) relate it to wealth and health while Alessie et al. (2006)
relate it to saving hoies. In the present paper we assume living arrange-
ment to be predetermined with respet to the aring hoie. This is learly a
simplifying assumption, nevertheless it is not unreasonable: the hypothesis is
that living arrangement depend on marriage, eduation or early job market
deisions, whih an be safely onsidered as predetermined when individu-
als deide how to alloate time to elders' are. Coresiding hildren are on
average younger than thirty years old, muh less than non ohabiting ones
7
.
Further on, they tend to help less. This dierene in the two subsample
may be due to the fat that ohabiting hildren still have to deide about
their adult life living arrangement and, at the same time, they have younger
parents whih do not need are. Thus desriptive statistis provide indiret
support to our assumption.
The main objetive of the empirial analysis is to estimate simultaneously
how hildren alloate time to informal are, ICi and paid workWTi, together
with the eet on their parents' utility, Ph. The system of simultaneous
equations we want to estimate is therefore the following:
Ph = β1,1IC1 + β1,2IC2 + β1,3IC3 + β1,4IC4+
+β1,5PhSP +Xβ1,6 +XPβ1,7 + u1
IC1 = γ2
∑
i6=1 ICi +Xβ2,6 +XICβ2,8 + β2,9WT1 + u2
.
.
.
.
.
.
IC4 = γ5
∑
i6=4 ICi +Xβ5,6 +XICβ5,8 + β5,9WT4 + u5
WT1 = β6,1IC1 +Xβ6,6 +XWTβ6,14 + u6
.
.
.
.
.
.
WT4 = β9,1IC4 +Xβ9,6 +XWTβ9,14 + u9
(19)
7
desriptive statistis are reported in the appendix
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Where X is a matrix of n observation over kX exogenous variables om-
mon to all equations (as an example ountry dummies), XP ,XIC ,XWT are
exogenous variables whih appear only on the parent's equation, informal
are equations and working hours equations respetively. PhSP is the health
status of the spouse. Sine eah spouse enters the sample, Phi is the de-
pendent variable for the ith observation, while it is PhSP , a regressor, for
the ith spouse observation. Then, we assume u1,i, u1,j to be orrelated if i, j
belong to the same household.
The eonomi model imposes restritions on the system whih allow us
to estimate the parameters in several steps:
1. First, the labor fore partiipation hoie of hild i is endogenous only
for i's informal are hoie. In terms of system (19), WTi appears as a
regressor only on ICi, while the only endogenous regressor in eahWTi
equation is ICi. Then if we assume u to be IID up to the household
level, we an use the usual two step proedure: we instrument WTi
with years of eduation and gender, then we plug WˆT is preditions in
ICi equations:
Ph = β1,1IC1 + β1,2IC2 + β1,3IC3 + β1,4IC4+
+β1,5PhSP +Xβ1,6 +XPβ1,7 + u1
IC1 = γ2
∑
i6=1 ICi +Xβ2, 6 +XICβ2, 8 + β2,9WˆT 1 + u2
.
.
.
.
.
.
IC4 = γ5
∑
i6=4 ICi +Xβ5,6 +XICβ5,8 + β5,9WˆT 4 + u5
(20)
2. In eah ICi equation informal are provided by i's siblings (ICjs) enter
only through
∑
j 6=i ICj. From an eonomi point of view, this is so
sine what matters on eah hild's deision is the aggregate supply of
are by his siblings. Endogeneity problem is still there sine
∑
j 6=i ICj
is a funtion of endogenous regressors. In order to solve it we an
use the fat that hildren ordering is exogenous: hildren ordering is
desending in age. Then, ICi ∀i an be thought of as sampled from
the same population. This fat allows us to stak ICi, WTi and all the
demographis in X whih refers to eah hild. The last four equations
of (20) an be rewritten as:
IC = γΠIC +Xβ2,6 +XICβ2,8 + β2,9WˆT + u2 (21)
Where [pi]ij = 1 if i 6= j and i, j are siblings.
Equation (21) is linear in means and the endogeneity of ΠIC is due to
the so alled `reetion problem' (see Manski (1993)): IC appears on
both sides of the equation. We an use spatial eonometris methods
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to estimate γ: Kelejian and Pruha (1998) suggest a GMM estima-
tor, whih has been used in a simultaneous equations setting in Pasini
(2006). Sine we assume u2 to be IID, the GMM estimator turns out to
be equal to a 2SLS estimator with instruments for ΠIC hosen among
ΠX and ΠXIC .
We have an additional problem at this step: a high number of hildren
do not provide any help. Thus data are learly ensored and they
may suer of a sample seletion problem. Therefore we estimate eah
equation with a Hekman twostep proedure (see Vella (1998) for a
general disussion on models with sample seletion), where individuals
rst hoose whether to help or not, then they hoose how muh time
to spend aring
8
. Consistently with the dependent variable, the total
number of other siblings helping enters the set of rst stage regressors,
while the total number of hours provided by other siblings enter the
seond stage.
3. The previous step's result an be used again as a preliminary step: we
obtain predited value ofΠ ˆICi and we use it to estimate the parameters
in the rst equation of (19)
Standard errors should be omputed taking into aount this proedure.
We didn't want to impose further struture on the distribution of the u
vetor and at the same time we were worried to aount for potential het-
eroskedastiity. Therefore, we used non parametri bootstrapping to obtain
standard errors and pvalues both at the seond and at the last step. We
an safely bootstrap on eah step separately thanks to the simple residuals
vetor of the redued form of (20).
5 Empirial Results
Results of the `hildren' part of the estimation proedure are reported in
the appendix, i.e. the Hekman estimates of hildren's hoie, where three
variables are treated as endogenous: in the rst stage probit, hours of payed
job and the number of siblings helping; in the seond stage linear regression,
hours of payed job and the total number of hours provided by other siblings.
The two main ndings are that labor fore partiipation eet is signi-
ant and negative on both stages, while soial interation's eet is signiant
only on the deision to are, but not on the are's intensity. Sine both hours
of work and soial interation parameters are instrumented, it's ruial that
the hosen instruments are valid and relevant. All the instruments pass a
Hansen J-test of over-identiation run on the two stages separately (Jstat
8
We hose not to use ML estimate beause endogeneity of WT makes onvergene hard
to get
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on rst stage, 6.821, pvalue 0.3378. Jstat on seond stage, 9.749, pvalue
0.1356). Years of eduation and gender are relevant and they have the ex-
peted signs on rst stage regressions, while the number of hildren of eah
hild is not signiant. Both Πhourshelp and Πchildhelp are instrumented
with the sums over the gender dummy, age, proximity, year of eduation and
a dummy for not being married. But for the sum of the gender dummy, all
the other instruments are relevant on both rst stage regressions. Further,
instruments are hosen appropriately: those supposed to instrument work
hours are not signiant on the soial interation rst stage equations, and
vie versa
9
. Hausman test support rejet exogeneity of other hildren's are
variables and hours of work: test statisti is 51.27, the pvalue lower than
0.001. Last thing to hek about the estimation proedure is the relevane
of sample seletion: the Mills' λ is signiant at 10% level.
Sign and signiane suggest that time devoted to aregiving and to
payed work are substitutes, as well as informal are provided by eah hild
and informal are of the other siblings. The last nding is partiularly rel-
evant: interation among hildren are signiant and their magnitude is
not negligible: an additional sibling helping indue a redution of 78.6%
on the probability of providing help, thus determinaning a large fration of
the seltion. The marginal eet of an additional hour of payed work is
quite small, but is one of the few regressors whih is relevant on the seond
stage equation. Substitutability amnog hildren's help together with non
signiane of expeted bequest rejets the hypothesis of strategi bequest
motive for are.
Country dummies
10
are in general signiant. Signs are all negative
in the seletion equation, i.e. on the deision whether to help or not, o-
herently with the desriptive statistis' evidene. Marginal eets on the
are intensity equation (thus orreted by the seletion mehanism) have
signs whih are oherent with soiologial explanations as in Reher (1998)
and with institutional dierenes: Northern ountries (Sweden, Denmark
and The Netherlands) have lower intensity ompared to Germany, southern
Countries (Italy and Spain) a positive one. Signs of other Central European
Countries are mixed. Nevertheless the non signiane of Country dummies
warn to interpret these results with aution.
Other ontrols have the expeted sign: the provision of are depends
positively on the number of parent's health diseases, and on age of the son.
Single hildren provide more help than those who have siblings, and there's
a positive and signiant relation between are and proximity of hildren
from parent's house: the nearest hild helps more than the hild who lives
far from parents.
Table 4 reports the results of the seond part of the estimation proedure:
9
rst stage equation results are again reported in the appendix
10
Germany is the exluded one
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2SLS estimates of the pereived health status of parent for both sales. The
pereived ondition worsen for older parents and for women
11
. Moreover,
subjetive health depends negatively on the years of eduation. As expeted,
there is a high positive orrelation between the selfreported health and the
objetive health, both in terms of ADL and hroni diseases. We ontrol
for formal aregiving, for household inome and expeted bequest. With
respet to inome and wealth, the pereption of health ondition is better the
higher the family inome. Spouse's pereived health has a positive marginal
eet, while the eet of the spouse's objetive health is negative. This
result provide indiret evidene on our laim that pereived health is a well
being measure: individual satisfation grows with the spouse's one (whih
ts with an altruisti utility funtion), while the objetive health eet may
aount for a `omparison' eet: if the spouse suer of hroni diseases,
the individual tend to value more his relatively healthier status. Country
dummies are all negative, again in line with the observation that a large
fration of hildren who help are from Germany. The main result is that
there is a negative eet of informal aregiving, whih is signiant with
the US sale: after ontrolling for objetive health, parent's status is better
when hildren helps him (remember that the dependent variables inrease as
health worsen). Furthermore, we tested whether parents value informal are
from eah hild dierently: we rerun the pereived health equation dividing
help from eah hild and tested whether the parameters were equal or not.
We aepted the test, thus supporting the hypothesis that parents value
informal are more than formal one, but they do not disriminate among
hildren.
Further on, our laim is that pereived health, Phi, is a good measure
of utility derived by are onsumption. SHARE provide us also a diret
measure of well being, i.e. a measure of subjetive overall satisfation. Sine
subjetive pereption of well being and health status are logially and empir-
ially positively orrelated, as a robustness hek we repeat our analysis on
the well being measure, and we nd qualitatively similar results with a lower
signiane, thus supporting the idea that pereived health is a more preise
measure of satisfation derived from health. The seond possible objetion
to our hoie of pereived health as a well being measure is the reverse: it
may simply apture health status, with no link to well being pereption. If
this is the ase, one ontrolling for objetive measures of health and dier-
enes in response sales (aptured by ountry dummies), other determinants
of individual utility should not be signiant. We showed that this is not the
ase, thus onrming that self reported health is not just another measure
of health status.
11
Gender is a dummy that takes value of 1 if women, 0 if man
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6 Conlusions
We developed a model for the interation among parents and their hildren
faing aring deisions. Children deide how to alloate time to payed work,
informal are to their parents and leisure. Deision is taken strategially, i.e.
eah hild's hoie depends on his siblings' behavior. The main nding for
this rst part of the model is that time devoted to informal are by hild
i and hild j are substitutes. Parents' utility depends both on formal are
bought on the market and informal are provided by his hildren. Parents
value informal are more than hildren do, therefore at any equilibrium they
would like to indue hildren to inrease informal are supply. We tested
for bequest as a possible mean for parents to indue suh extra supply by
hildren. Estimation results do not support the strategi bequest motive,
therefore one the interation eet among hildren is ontrolled for, then
positive and heterogeneous informal are provision is due to altruism and
soiologial and ultural attitudes. Further on, we do not nd evidene of
substitutability of formal and informal are. While the rst result is useful
to understand the dynami of hoies within households, the seond one
provides an important poliy impliation: formal are is not an instrument
to improve labor fore partiipation. As an example, onsider a mother of
a baby that also has to take are of an elder disabled parent. We laim
that her reservoir wage depends on both types of are, but the State annot
redue it by providing formal are for the elderly.
We used self reported health as a measure of well being: after ontrolling
for formal are and objetive health status, suh a measure is still informative
and aptures parent's utility derived from are onsumption. This has a
relevant empirial impliation: the good news are that we an extrat more
information than just health onditions from subjetive questions, the bad
news are that, one we rely on those measures instead of objetively measured
health, results may be biased.
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A Estimation results and Desriptive statistis
Table 3: First stage 2SLS regressions
hours of job other's help other's hours of help
years of eduation 0.658
∗∗∗
-0.001
∗
-0.016
(0.034) (0.001) (0.015)
# of hildren -1.290
∗∗∗
-0.000 -0.124
(0.103) (0.002) 0.045
other hildren's gender -0.305
∗∗
-0.000 0.241
∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.003) (0.063)
other hildren's age -0.011
∗∗
0.002
∗∗∗
0.016
∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.000) (0.002)
other's single ondition -0.892
∗∗∗
-0.009
∗∗∗
-0.019
(0.160) (0.005) (0.069)
other years of eduation 0.062
∗∗∗
-0.001
∗∗
-0.048
∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.000) (0.007)
other proximity -0.921
∗∗∗
0.024
∗∗∗
0.584
∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.004) (0.084)
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Table 4: Two-stage Hekman with endogenous regressors
Seond stage First stage
hours of help help from hild
m.e oe m.e oe
hours of work 0.180 0.117 -0.001 -0.009
∗∗
(0.167) (0.005)
# siblings helping -0.106 -1.053
∗∗∗
(0.305)
hours of help from other siblings 9.038 1.796
(1.351)
gender 4.130 3.939
∗∗
-0.003 -0.028
(1.761) (0.048)
age -0.030 0.170
∗∗
0.003 0.029
∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.002)
single 3.249 2.176
∗
-0.015 -0.156
∗∗∗
(1.256) (0.033)
Austria 0.612 -0.136 -0.010 -0.109
∗∗
(1.080) (0.055)
Sweden -0.372 -0.252
∗∗
-0.023 -0.273
∗∗∗
(1.085) (0.049)
The Netherlands -0.693 -3.728
∗∗∗
-0.033 -0.441
∗∗∗
(1.348) (0.061)
Spain 8.330 1.822 -0.052 -0.946
∗∗∗
(3.900) (0.073)
Italy 11.593 6.250 -0.047 -0.777
∗∗∗
(4.100) (0.068)
Frane 5.525 1.583 -0.040 -0.573
∗∗∗
(2.624) (0.062)
Denmark -0.406 -0.053 0.005 0.051
(1.241) (0.055)
Greee 2.629 -0.050 -0.030 -0.390
∗∗∗
(1.391) (0.056)
Switzerland -0.664 -2.749 -0.024 -0.303
∗∗∗
(1.838) (0.080)
Belgium 1.574 -1.672 -0.036 -0.472
∗∗∗
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Table 4: Two-stage Hekman with endogenous regressors
Seond stage First stage
hours of help help from hild
m.e oe m.e oe
(1.680) (0.055)
# adl -0.939 0.374 0.019 0.191
∗∗∗
(1.033) (0.022)
# spouse's adl 2.302 2.788 0.007 0.071
∗∗∗
(2.817) (0.023)
hours of nursing are -0.062 -0.029 0.000 0.005
(0.150) (0.003)
hours of paid professional help 0.052 0.052 0.000 0.000
(0.283) (0.002)
weeks reeived meals-on-wheels -0.071 0.011 0.001 0.012
∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.002)
proximity 7.054 9.280
∗∗∗
0.033 0.323
∗∗∗
(2.946) (0.050)
only hild 1.945 2.208
∗
0.004 0.038
(1.206) (0.053)
expeted bequest -0.583 -0.540 0.001 0.006
(0.465) (0.012)
# of hroni diseases 0.009 0.091
∗∗∗
(0.010)
# of spouse's hroni diseases 0.000 0.004
∗∗∗
(0.000)
household inome -0.005 -0.052
∗∗∗
(0.008)
household wealth -0.080 -0.007 -0.001 -0.013
∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.003)
nanial transfers -1.743 0.961 0.018 0.165
∗∗∗
(1.146) (0.036)
ostant -15.793
∗
-1.774
∗∗∗
(9.240) (0.226)
sample size 26,867
unensored obs 1,828
λ 6.582
∗∗
(2.771)
Note: bootstrapped standard errors robust in parentheses.
(*) Signiant at 10%. (**)Signiant at 5%. (***)Signiant at 1%
Germany is the exluded ountry
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Table 5: Pereived health equation
EU sale US sale Well-being
age 0.004
∗∗∗
0.006
∗∗∗
-0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
gender -0.005 0.021 0.022
∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
years of eduation -0.022
∗∗∗
-0.025
∗∗∗
-0.006
∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
partner -0.207
∗∗∗
-0.311
∗∗∗
-0.578
∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.034) (0.030)
Austria -0.144
∗∗∗
-0.246
∗∗∗
-0.044
∗
(0.027) (0.032) (0.024)
Sweden -0.326
∗∗∗
-0.687
∗∗∗
-0.071
∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.002)
The Netherlands -0.264
∗∗∗
-0.307
∗∗∗
-0.263
∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.028) (0.022)
Spain -0.168
∗∗∗
-0.225
∗∗∗
-0.107
∗∗
(0.031) (0.034) (0.032)
Italy -0.087
∗∗∗
-0.154
∗∗∗
0.133
∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.027)
Frane -0.248
∗∗∗
-0.214
∗∗∗
0.115
∗∗
(0.023) (0.027) (0.025)
Denmark -0.301
∗∗∗
-0.553
∗∗∗
-0.339
(0.028) (0.033) (0.024)
Greee -0.317
∗∗∗
-0.322
∗∗∗
-0.046
(0.024) (0.027) (0.024)
Switzerland -0.365
∗∗∗
-0.343
∗∗∗
-0.130
∗
(0.032) (0.040) (0.031)
Belgium -0.308
∗∗∗
-0.341
∗∗∗
-0.100
∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.021)
# adl 0.298
∗∗∗
0.287
∗∗∗
0.099
∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
# spouse's adl -0.009 0.000 0.022
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
spouse's pereived health 0.150
∗∗∗
0.162
∗∗∗
0.292
∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
# of hroni diseases 0.249
∗∗∗
0.293
∗∗∗
0.045
∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
# of spouse's hroni diseases -0.042
∗∗∗
-0.051
∗∗∗
-0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
help from hildren -0.005
∗∗∗
-0.008
∗∗∗
-0.004
∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
hours of nursing are 0.002 0.003
∗
0.002
∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
hours of paid professional help 0.002 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
weeks reeived meals-on-wheels 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
household inome -0.012
∗∗∗
-0.016
∗∗∗
0.013
∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
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Table 5: Pereived health equation
EU sale US sale Well-being
household wealth -0.007
∗∗∗
-0.005
∗∗
-0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
expeted bequest -0.026
∗∗∗
-0.037
∗∗∗
-0.025
∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
only hild 0.050
∗∗∗
0.057
∗∗∗
0.042
∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
ostant 2.583
∗∗∗
3.262
∗∗∗
2.581
∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.123) (0.105)
sample size 16248 16242 10323
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Table 6: Sample harateristis of are-giving hildren
SE DK NL DE BE FR AT CH IT ES GR
# of observations 3,597 1,761 2,523 2,508 3611 2624 1832 945 2471 2270 2725
(tot 26867)
% oresiding 5.95 5.57 12.72 10.41 15.59 13.61 11.30 13.76 34.80 30.62 33.61
average age:
oresidents 21.87 23.50 23.14 26.59 25.52 24.00 29.54 23.48 28.70 29.62 25.66
non o-resident 37.36 37.82 36.03 38.13 37.63 37.15 38.69 37.82 38.54 38.79 38.43
working hours:
men 30.99 29.07 30.86 30.30 30.03 27.97 33.65 36.51 30.94 32.59 30.49
women 25.84 23.10 21.73 22.28 25.61 23.98 25.39 25.79 21.36 22.38 20.81
years of eduation 12.42 13.85 13.19 14.52 11.36 12.56 12.66 13.46 11.74 10.69 12.74
number of hildren 1.23 1.24 0.94 0.98 1.14 1.12 1.08 0.93 0.81 0.93 0.83
single (%) 33.53 49.12 38.92 46.05 34.89 48.93 46.29 52.06 43.18 40.79 48.51
Proximity to parents (%):
same building 0.50 0.68 0.48 7.54 1.02 0.69 8.52 3.17 7.49 3.30 9.28
less than 1 km 8.59 7.50 10.74 8.81 12.85 8.00 11.52 8.99 12.71 21.06 11.71
less than 5 km 16.24 15.11 24.02 16.95 20.83 12.12 17.90 14.81 14.12 13.88 11.34
less than 25 km 22.02 25.55 22.00 20.57 27.31 20.12 22.54 25.08 14.20 11.94 12.51
less than 100 km 17.60 22.32 16.69 13.60 15.51 16.43 12.77 17.88 6.48 7.36 4.59
less than 500 km 18.71 18.80 10.82 15.15 4.26 13.99 11.08 11.32 3.04 6.17 10.02
more than 500 km 10.40 4.49 2.54 6.98 2.63 15.05 4.37 4.97 7.16 5.68 6.94
only hild (%) 7.53 7.95 6.42 15.03 12.13 11.01 13.86 8.78 11.41 8.50 9.54
help to parents (%) 7.40 11.19 4.76 11.60 5.62 4.54 10.86 5.82 4.01 3.30 7.49
help from daughter 40.23 41.12 49.17 54.30 55.67 57.98 53.77 61.82 63.64 65.33 57.84
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